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Abstract: The problems with China’s regional industrial overcapacity are often 
influenced by local governments. This study constructs a framework that includes the 
resource and environmental costs to analyze overcapacity using the non-radial 
direction distance function and the price method to measure industrial capacity 
utilization and market segmentation in 29 provinces in China from 2002 to 2014. The 
empirical analysis of the spatial panel econometric model shows that (1) the industrial 
capacity utilization in China’s provinces has a ladder-type distribution with a gradual 
decrease from east to west and there is a severe overcapacity in the traditional heavy 
industry areas; (2) local government intervention has serious negative effects on 
regional industry utilization and factor market segmentation more significantly 
inhibits the utilization rate of regional industry than commodity market segmentation; 
(3) economic openness improves the utilization rate of industrial capacity while the 
internet penetration rate and regional environmental management investment have no 
significant impact; and (4) a higher degree of openness and active private economic 
development have a positive spatial spillover effect, while there is a significant 
negative spatial spillover effect from local government intervention and industrial 
structure sophistication. This paper includes the impact of resources and the 
environment in overcapacity evaluations, which should guide sustainable development in 
emerging economies. 
Key words: local government intervention; market segmentation; overcapacity; 
resource and environmental costs. 
1. Introduction 
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With China's gradual transition from a traditional planned economy to a modern 
market economy, the mode by which local governments affect the economy gradually 
shifted from planned direct intervention to moderate macroeconomic regulation and 
provision of public services, emphasizing that production should follow market 
demand and relying on consumption, investment, and export tripartite cooperation to 
promote economic growth. In recent years, officials' mechanisms to promote 
economic growth as the core evaluation index has driven the local government to 
influence regional industrial development through administrative intervention and 
generate rapid economic growth in the short term. The regional economic competition 
not only led to market segmentation, industry homogeneity, structural supply 
shortages and other issues, products with low technical content, backward production 
efficiency, and weak supply-side market competitiveness, but also worsened the 
issues of resource waste and environmental pollution. 
In reality, local governments’ obstruction of the cross-regional free flow of 
goods results in the repetitive construction of low-level industrial structures. There are 
three resulting overcapacity problems. First, local governments invest energy, mineral 
and land resources in a local financing platform, through which it conducts business 
in a micro-market. Second, local governments tended to reduce the threshold of 
investment through cheap land, tax subsidies, low-interest credit, and other 
preferential policies. This led to the rapid development of iron and steel, automobiles, 
electrolytic aluminum, and other traditional industries, as well as the accidental 
launch of biotechnology, new materials, new energy vehicles manufacturing, and 
other emerging strategic industries. Third, there are strategic interaction issues in 
regional economic competition. Regional planning of industrial development often 
provokes copycat and competitive moves by adjacent regions. The convergence of 
regional industrial structures reaches a high level, while reducing product technology 
complexity and market competitiveness. A solidified regional industrial structure will 
eventually lead to a serious resource mismatch. From the perspective of regional 
economic competition, local government intervention in the economy may hinder the 
free movement of regional goods and factors. Considering the interaction 
characteristics of the inter-regional strategies, does the regional production 
overcapacity induced by local governments’ intervention in the economy and market 
segmentation strategy affect other regions by spatial correlation effects 
simultaneously? 
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As the leading emerging economy, China can influence relevant emerging 
economies, such as Brazil and India. Sustainability scholars discuss a number of 
relevant issues based on the reality of emerging economies such as Brazil, India, and 
China (Shahbaz et al. 2015; Marcelino et al. 2015). One of the key issues is how 
organizations from developing countries are achieving their economic goals and 
sustainable development simultaneously (Gunasekaran et al. 2014), and researchers 
apply Directional Distance Functions (DDF) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
methods in such studies (Rosanopeña et al. 2014; Santana et al. 2014). 
This study offers three main contributions. First, it investigates the impact of 
commodity and factor market segmentation on overcapacity from the perspective of 
local government intervention. Second, it includes sustainable development factors 
such as resource consumption and environmental pollution in the framework to 
analyze regional overcapacity. It also uses the non-radial direction distance function 
(NDDF) to evaluate the level of overcapacity in each of China’s provinces. Finally, 
the spatial econometric analysis framework also considers the spatial correlation 
characteristics of overcapacity and the factors that affect regional industrial 
overcapacity. The study’s conclusions are thus more in line with actual regional 
characteristics. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis  
2.1 Local government intervention and market segmentation  
Since the reform and opening up, China has experienced more than 30 years of 
economic growth. Local governments had an important role in regional economic 
growth, especially in the 1990s, when fiscal decentralization reform allowed local 
governments to share financial revenue with the central government, thus motivating 
local governments to develop the economy to increase fiscal revenue (Gan et al. 2015; 
Qian and Roland 1998). Local governments tend to use a tendentious fiscal 
expenditure structure or administrative power to intervene in the prices of land, 
resources, and capital. Local enterprises can conduct production and investment 
activities with low land and financing costs compared to the market values, which 
may induce resource misallocation and factor market segmentation (Jin et al. 2015; 
Song and Jin 2016). The current common market segmentation measurement methods 
in academic research include the production, trade, price, and other methods. Among 
them, the production method measures the degree of market segmentation by 
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analyzing the differences in the output structures, production efficiency, inter-regional 
industrial structure, degree of specialization, and capital marginal output of the 
important products in each province (Young 2000). The trade method examines 
regional protection and market segmentation by analyzing the trade volume, trade 
intensity, and trade structures among regions through gravitational and boundary 
effect models (Poncet 2003). The price method measures the degree of market 
integration and segmentation by the relative price of goods or factors among regions 
(Parsley and Wei 2001; Jin et al. 2015). The smaller the coefficient of variation and 
the boundary effect of commodity or factor prices, the higher the degree of market 
integration. However, this also indicates declining local protection and market 
segmentation levels. 
2.2 Causes of and methods to evaluate industrial overcapacity 
There are different explanations of the causes of overcapacity in academic circles 
inside and outside of China. Foreign scholars usually think that overcapacity is a 
natural phenomenon in a market economy (Stiglitz 1999). The mismatch between 
business investment growth and market demand during a period of economic 
prosperity makes the timely exit of production factors difficult. Some companies even 
send threat signals to potential market entrants with strategic overcapacity (Spence 
1977; Barham and Ware 1993). Some scholars believe that overcapacity is a 
reasonable idle capacity that a firm has to maintain in response to market demand 
uncertainty (Paha 2013). In contrast, scholars in China offer different explanations of 
overcapacity. First, local officials are incentivized to distort policy. Some scholars 
argue that promotion incentives and undue local government interventions allow 
companies to acquire land, capital, and resources at a lower cost, helping to expand 
their own production capacity and leading to overcapacity (Gan et al. 2015). Second, 
Chinese scholars propose the wave phenomenon caused by market failure. Lin et al. 
(2010) believe that because it is difficult for enterprises to acquire a number of 
enterprises within an industry, they can only make production decisions to maximize 
their own profit. The "individual rationality" of a single enterprise will eventually lead 
to "group irrationality" for all enterprises. The overcapacity caused by the investment 
wave phenomenon is particularly prevalent in developing countries. However, some 
scholars believe that the investment wave phenomenon is actually the result of local 
governments’ subsidies for investment, which distort corporate investment behavior 
rather than lead to overcapacity. The main reason for this phenomenon is 
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over-investment in many industries under the transformation context (Jiang et al. 
2012). Researchers commonly measure overcapacity using enterprise survey data 
(Gan et al. 2015), the cost function method (Segerson and Squires 1993), stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) (Kirkley et al. 2002), data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
(Sahoo and Tone 2009), and other methods. Each method has advantages and 
disadvantages, which leads to significant differences in the research conclusions. 
The main strand of the literature analyzing the causes and impacts of 
overcapacity take the perspectives of government intervention and market failure, 
while few studies analyze overcapacity from the perspective of market segmentation. 
In addition, most empirical analyses ignore the strategic game behavior and spatial 
correlation characteristics between regions. Studying different regions as independent 
individuals can lead to false conclusions based on the results. Given the existing 
literature, this study proposes the following hypotheses: 
1. Local governments distort the allocation mechanisms of labor, capital, energy, 
and other factors by hindering the cross-regional free flow of goods and factors, 
which hampers regional industries’ capacity utilization. Local government economic 
intervention through fiscal policy exacerbates the suppression effect. 
2. Considering the actual characteristics of promotion incentives and regional 
strategic interaction, both local government intervention and the spatial spillover 
effects of neighboring regional governments’ interventions directly affect capacity 
utilization. 
3. Regional industrial overcapacity and market segmentation in 
China 
3.1 Measurement of industrial capacity utilization with the directional distance 
function  
While the current theoretical analysis and normative research on overcapacity is 
in-depth, there are still many approaches to selecting appropriate indicators to 
describe the level of regional or industrial overcapacity accurately. Although the 
central and local governments increasingly emphasize overcapacity management, the 
statistics department has not yet published excess capacity indicators in specific 
statistics. Many studies use the cost function method, SFA, DEA and other methods to 
estimate capacity utilization. The World Bank published data on Chinese enterprises’ 
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capacity utilization based on a questionnaire survey1, though it may suffer from 
subjective survey results, insufficient survey samples, and a narrow time range. This 
paper argues that overcapacity measures the extent that the actual output of a sector is 
lower than the potential capacity in a certain period. A DEA model based on the 
NDDF uses input factors such as capital, labor, energy, and economic output to build 
a production frontier to measure the actual and potential output levels of each 
decision-making unit (DMU). This study uses a consistent logic to construct the 
model and define overcapacity. The model allows the simultaneous inclusion of 
economic benefits as the expected output and environmental pollution as the 
undesirable output, which is more realistic than in previous studies of capacity 
utilization. Therefore, this study builds a model based on Gan et al. (2015), Jin et al. 
(2015), and Song and Jin (2016) to measure the regional industrial capacity utilization 
level. 
There is a set of numbers representing production potential P( ) x, y,b , where x, 
y, and b represent the input factors, expectations, and undesirable output respectively. 
D ( ; ) = sup{w : ( ) + ( ) }Tx, y,b g x, y,b g d Pb b× Î
r
 is the NDDF, in which d  and g  are 
the diagonal matrix and direction vector, respectively. 
w ( , , , , , , )T Tk l e gdp so nox wsw w w w w w w2=  represents the standardized weight vector of 
capital k, labor l, energy e, industrial economic output gdp, industrial sulfur dioxide, 
industrial nitrogen oxides nox, and industrial solid waste ws; 
( , , , , , , )T Tk l e gdp so nox ws2 0b b b b b b b b= ³  represents the inefficiency level of inputs and 
outputs. According to Zhang and Choi (2013), the input factors, such as labor, capital, 
and so on directly affect economic output rather than pollutant discharge. Therefore, 
( , , , , , , )e gdp so nox wsg g g g g g20 0= - - - -  and w ( , , / , / , / , / , / )T T0 0 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5=  lead to 
the following linear programming equation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/enterprise-surveys 
D ( ; ) = max( + )e e gdp gdp so so nox nox ws wsx, y,b g w w w w w2 2b b b b b+ + +
r
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where D ( ; ) =0x, y,b g
r
 indicates an optimal efficiency value of the DMU and 
constructs a capacity utilization index of the DMUs according to the definition of 
capacity utilization. 
 
This study uses the Maxdea 6.4 software package to calculate the ratio of the 
actual to the ideal industrial output of each province; that is, the industrial capacity 
utilization level of each province. To clarify the calculation results, this study uses the 
Arcgis 10.0 software package to map the industrial capacity utilization and industrial 
potential productivity figures of China’s provinces for 2014 (Figures 1 and 2). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 1 & 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 shows an obvious ladder-type distribution difference in the industrial 
capacity utilization of China's provinces, in which most provinces in the eastern 
region (except Fujian) maintain a relatively high capacity utilization; and provinces in 
the central region such as Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and in northeastern 
region including Helongjiang and Jilin have a relatively low capacity utilization. Note 
that Heilongjiang and Jilin are the traditional heavy industry districts in China, and 
with the depletion of oil, coal and other resources, resource-intensive industries have 
been in serious decline. In the industrial structure of provinces in the western region, 
such as Xinjiang, Gansu, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, resource extraction and 
processing of nonferrous metals, petroleum, coal, and other resources accounts for a 
higher proportion, and with the loss of the resource dividend, the adjustment of the 
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industrial structure, and the saturation of domestic market demand, their capacity 
utilization declines in an increasingly apparent way. Meanwhile, Jiangxi province in 
the central region and the Inner Mongolia autonomous region in the western area 
demonstrate a notable overcapacity tendency during the strategic development of their 
emerging industries. The photovoltaic industry of the former province, and the wind 
and solar energy industries in the latter are both typical examples of overcapacity.  
Figure 2 shows that some provinces in China had higher potential industrial 
outputs in 2014, such as Fujian on the eastern coast and Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, 
and Jiangxi in central China, and their industries have the larger potential in 
improving capacity. 
3.2 Measurement of market segmentation level 
This study follows Gui et al. (2006), Jin et al. (2015), and Song and Jin (2016) to 
construct a market segmentation index based on regional commodities and 
factor-relative price information in an attempt to reflect the regional protection level 
from the perspectives of products and factors as two market segments. Suppose that 
the price of certain commodities in Areas A and B are AP  and BP , respectively. Due 
to the iceberg cost AP C  (where C is the ratio of unit cost to unit price) of commodity 
flows between the two areas, and if and only if A A BP P C P− > , then the arbitrage 
interval between the two areas will lead to goods flowing from B to A. Otherwise, the 
relative price of goods of the two areas is in the non-arbitrage interval [1 C,1/ (1 C)]− − . 
The factors have similar properties as the mechanism for commodities. This study 
uses 3-dimensional data (time, region, commodity/factor type; t m k× × ), in which the 
time range is from 2002 to 2014 and the district scope is limited to 29 provinces 
(Tibet, Hainan, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are not included in the analysis due to 
the severe lack of data). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
First, this study measures the commodity market segmentation index according 
to the retail price index of 16 categories of goods, and calculates the absolute value of 
the relative commodity  price kijtQ∆  in the adjacent area 
1 1Ln( / ) Ln( / )
k k k k k
ijt it jt it jtQ P P P P− −∆ = − , where k denotes the kth commodity, where 
the authors use the price information of 16 categories of goods to obtain 64 sets of 
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data from neighboring provinces for 13 years, resulting in 13,312 relative price 
indices kijtQ∆ . Furthermore, this study uses the de-mean method (Lu and Chen 2009) 
to eliminate the system error caused by the fixed effect associated with a particular 
commodity, that is, the study assumes that kijtQ∆  is composed of ka  and kijtε ; the 
former related only to commodity type k, and the latter related to the special market 
environments in i and j. Through the de-mean method, the study obtains the mean 
value of commodity k ktQ∆  among 64 sets of data from neighboring provinces in the 
tth year, and then obtaining =( ) ( )k k k k k kijt t ijt ijtQ Q a a ε ε∆ − ∆ − + −  and 
k k k k k
ijt ijt ijt ijt tq Q Qε ε= − = ∆ − ∆ . Finally, the variance of kijtq  as VAR( )kijtq  represents the 
market integration degree index of a commodity in each province annually, reflecting 
the size of the arbitrage interval due to market segmentation factors. This study 
combines the commodity market segmentation indices of 64 sets of data from 
neighboring provinces based on the province, and the market segmentation index of a 
certain province can be calculated by the mean of the province and other neighboring 
provinces. Similarly, based on Jin et al. (2015) and Song and Jin (2016), this study 
measures and obtains the factor market segmentation index for each province from 
2002-2014.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 3 & 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 shows that most eastern provinces, except Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Shanghai, as well as central provinces including Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, and Jiangxi, 
have a relatively low level of commodity market segmentation. The western regions 
of China, especially Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi, have serious regional 
protectionism. Of particular note are the higher market segmentation indexes of 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and other economically highly developed areas. Gui et al. 
(2006) argue that the Beijing-Tianjin region has a higher market segmentation level 
probably because their status as a municipality may enable the region to obtain special 
policies and force neighboring provinces take non-cooperative measures to protect 
their own interests, resulting in serious market segmentation problems.  
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Figure 4 shows that China's factor market segmentation has an obvious 
north-south regional difference (Song and Jin 2016), among which Xinjiang, Gansu, 
Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Hebei, Liaoning, and other provinces have a more serious 
factor segmentation level, while the factor market segmentation level of Guangdong, 
Fujian, Hunan, Yunnan, and other southern provinces is relatively low, probably 
because compared to the North, the South has a higher economic level and more free 
and frequent cross-regional mobility in various factors. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Spatial correlation test 
The capacity utilization of regional enterprises not only depends on the relevant 
factors in the region, but also on other regions through the spatial correlation. 
Therefore, before building the econometric model, this study uses the popular 
Moran’I index to examine whether there is a spatial correlation between the data. The 
index is constructed as follows: 
 
Moran’ I=  
 
The local Moran I index in this study’s data is -0.07, significant at the 5% level. 
It confirmed that the spatial econometric approach is appropriate for the empirical 
analysis. 
4.2 Spatial panel econometric model 
Following Elhorst (2010), this study uses a more general spatial Durbin panel 
model in the following form: 
 
 
where 
tY  represents the dependent variable, w  represents the spatial weighted 
matrix when N N×  with a diagonal element of 0; κ  and β  are response 
parameters in the model; µ , ϕ , and ε  are disturbing terms; and ρ  and σ  are 
spatial autocorrelation coefficients. In addition, this study uses the spatial 
neighborhood weight matrix in the measurement and estimation, and two provinces 
sharing the same boundary are considered spatially proximal. Moreover, the logarithm 
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of each index is used to eliminate the effect of extreme values on heteroscedasticity, 
thereby making the data more stable. 
4.3 Indicator selection and data description 
World Bank defines capacity utilization as the ratio of an enterprise’s actual 
output to the optimal output from the use of all resources, depicting the actual 
utilization level of the production equipment in the engineering sense. Accordingly, 
this study incorporates the DEA technique to construct the production frontier under 
the ideal state, measures and obtains the actual and ideal industrial output in the 
region, and calculates the regional industrial capacity utilization to describe the 
regional industrial overcapacity degree. The core independent variables are the 
segmentation levels of two markets in the region using the market segmentation index 
constructed according to the relative price information of regional goods and factors. 
Prior studies show that a higher proportion of regional fiscal expenditures in 
GDP indicate a stronger ability of local governments to intervene in the economy. 
Therefore, this study uses the proportion of a local government’s budgetary and 
off-budget expenditures in GDP to describe their intervention in the economy. In 
addition, this study incorporates the ratio of the output of private enterprises above a 
designated size to the output of industrial enterprises above a designated size to 
describe the regional industrial ownership structure, the proportion of tertiary industry 
output to describe the sophistication of regional industries, the ratio of regional import 
and export trade volume to GDP to describe foreign trade dependence, the proportion 
of investment volume of regional environmental governance in GDP to describe the 
environmental governance level, and the penetration rate of regional internet to 
describe the informatization level as control variables in the analysis framework. 
The industrial energy consumption data for each province to calculate capacity 
utilization were collected from the China Energy Statistical Yearbook; the industrial 
“three wastes” discharge data are from the China Environment Statistical Yearbook; 
the industrial capital stock data for each province from 2002-2014 are from Wu 
(2016); on-post staff and workers in each province, commodity price chain index, 
foreign direct investment in the region, tertiary industry output value, import and 
export trade volume, and other data are from the China Statistical Yearbook; and the 
output data for private enterprises above a designated size comes from the Chinese 
Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook. 
4.4 Empirical results based on the spatial econometric model 
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This study uses general least squares regression (OLS) - spatial Durbin model 
(Durbin) - spatial lag model (SAR), or the spatial error model (SEM) combined with 
spatial econometrics to determine the specific form of the econometric model. Table 2 
reports the OLS model estimation results, and shows that LM-lag and LM-error tests 
both maintained a 5% significance level, indicating that the spatial Durbin model 
should be the first considered for the estimation. To make the estimation result more 
robust, this study uses spatial fixed effects, time fixed effects, two-way fixed effects, 
and random effects of space and time. The results of the Hausman test show that the 
random effect model is more appropriate, and the results of Wald-spatial-lag and 
Wald-spatial-error tests suggest that the spatial Durbin model estimated by random 
effects will not degrade to a more specialized SAR or SEM. The factor market 
segmentation index, as the core explanatory variable, shows a significant negative 
impact in multiple models, indicating that the market segmentation behavior 
characterized by the cross-regional free flow of various factors inhibits the capacity 
utilization of regional industry and ultimately leads to excess capacity. However, the 
influence of the commodity market segmentation index on overcapacity is not 
significant due to the rapid development of the e-commerce and modern logistics 
industry. The price of cross-regional commodities has become highly consistent, and 
the flow restrictions have been declining. In contrast, cross-regional flows of labor, 
capital, raw materials, and other factors are still affected by the household registration 
system, capital controls, and government intervention, thus resulting in price 
fluctuations in space. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among other control variables, a higher proportion of the economy in private 
hands helps to improve the capacity utilization level. Due to the important role of 
steel, coal enterprises, and other large state-owned enterprises in regional GDP, 
taxation, and employment, once the enterprises face collapse, equipment shutdown, or 
restructuring, local governments usually have a policy bias to protect backward 
companies. In comparison, private enterprises will typically adjust production and 
operation strategy quickly in an economic downturn or a serious profit-declining 
period, thus transferring and allocating the limited resources to other production and 
operation areas. The results show a negative correlation between the sophistication of 
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the industrial structure, the service industry proportion, and the capacity utilization 
level because deviating from regional factor endowments and economic structure 
features by blindly pursuing a sophisticated industrial structure might weaken or even 
undermine the foundation of industrial structure rationalization, consequently harming 
the rational allocation of resources and factors among industries, It is noteworthy that 
local government intervention has a severe negative effect on capacity utilization 
(coefficient of -0.282, significant at the 1% level), indicating that, driven by an 
economic contest, local governments often adopt the industrial policy of neighboring 
districts as a reference to strengthen financial support for key regional projects, and 
this policy intervention targeting industrial development usually leads to factor price 
distortions, repeatedly launched construction projects, and other problems, thus 
further significantly inhibiting capacity utilization in the regional industry. Increased 
openness helps to improve capacity utilization because the export trade will 
encourage all types of factors to transfer from low efficiency enterprises to high 
efficiency ones, thereby improving industrial productivity. In addition, it benefits 
industrial enterprises to absorb and digest advanced technologies by importing 
high-tech intermediate products, and consequently improving their own capacity 
utilization level. There is no evidence that internet penetration rate and investment in 
regional environmental governance have a significant effect on capacity utilization. 
Table 2 shows that the spatial lag items of the independent variables such as the 
proportion of private enterprises, industrial structure sophistication, government 
intervention, level of openness, and the investment in regional environmental 
governance are significant, and the estimated coefficient of the spatial lag items 
W dep.var×  of the dependent variable is -0.195,  significant at the 1% level, 
meaning that regional capacity utilization may be spatially dependent and further 
analysis of the presence of spatial spillover effects should be conducted. According to 
Elhorst (2010), the spatial effects of the above variables on capacity utilization can be 
decomposed into direct and indirect effects, with the spatial spillover effect judged by 
the significance level of the latter. Table 3 reports these results. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 shows that the direct and indirect effect coefficients related to the private 
economy and dependence on foreign trade are both significantly positive, indicating 
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that openness and active private economic development not only have a positive 
impact on local capacity utilization, but also that a certain positive spatial correlation 
among regions exists. When local and adjacent areas are in a highly developed and 
open market environment, the cross-regional free flow of capital, labor, technology, 
and other factors will promote regional private economic development in a 
complementary, mutually reinforced manner. The positive spatial spillover effect will 
also comprehensively improve the capacity utilization of each region. Both local 
government intervention and industrial structure sophistication have significant 
negative spatial spillover effects, which lead to a convergence of the regional 
industrial structure and factor allocation distortion by influencing the industrial 
structure adjustment in the region, thus having a negative impact on the capacity 
utilization of the region and its neighboring areas. 
5. Conclusion and policy suggestions 
This paper analyzes the mechanism of market segmentation affecting the excess 
capacity in the context of local government competition and thus measures the 
regional commodity and factor market segmentation according to the price method, 
and then constructs a direction distance function considering the resource and 
environment factors to measure the industrial capacity utilization in 29 provinces in 
China. The study finally conducts an empirical analysis using a spatial econometric 
approach. 
This study has several interesting findings. First, the industrial capacity 
utilization in China’s provinces shows a ladder-type distribution, and is gradually 
decreasing from east to west. The traditional heavy industry districts with a high 
proportion of resource-intensive industries show severe excess capacity, while low 
capacity utilization also appears in the strategic development of emerging industries 
in some areas. Second, compared to the northeastern and western regions, commodity 
market segmentation in the eastern and central provinces is relatively low, 
characterized by initial divergence and subsequent convergence. In contrast, the factor 
market segmentation in each province shows a relatively obvious difference between 
the northern and southern regions. Most provinces have characteristics of limited 
factor mobility and distorted resource allocation. Third, compared to commodity 
market segmentation, the factor market segmentation that impedes the free flow of 
factors significantly inhibits regional industrial capacity utilization. Local government 
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intervention and industrial structure sophistication have a serious negative effect on 
regional industrial capacity utilization, and a relatively high degree of openness helps 
to enhance regional industrial capacity utilization; however, there is no significant 
effect from the internet penetration rate and regional environmental governance 
investment. Finally, the higher degree of openness and active private economic 
development show a positive spatial spillover effect, which facilitates the overall 
improvement in regional capacity utilization. Local government intervention and 
industrial structure sophistication have a significant negative spatial spillover effect, 
which will lead to the convergence of the regional industrial structure and factor 
allocation distortion, and an ultimate negative impact on capacity utilization in the 
local and other neighboring areas.  
The findings offer a number of policy implications. Overcapacity is closely 
related to local government intervention and market segmentation. Therefore, in the 
future, it is necessary to firmly establish a decisive mechanism for resource allocation 
based on the market. From the sustainable development perspective, policymakers 
should coordinate the relationship between industrial development and environmental 
protection, and promulgate more environmental protection laws to enhance pollution 
regulations. In addition, policymakers should clarify a reasonable boundary to market 
intervention and correct the distortions of the existing system on the market by 
deregulating factor mobility, reducing improper financial subsidiaries, encouraging 
free and reasonable competition among enterprises, and employing other means. 
Central and local governments should adjust the current fiscal and taxation system 
and the official assessment mechanism and correct the tendentious financial 
expenditure structure. This would achieve a more efficient and reasonable allocation 
of public resources. In addition, compared to the traditional development mode that 
only focuses on economic growth, future researchers and policymakers should include 
resource and environmental constraints in the process of assessing regional capacity 
utilization and development quality, In particular, the transformation to energy 
conservation in traditional industries and green technology innovation, implies that 
manufacturing techniques should be improved while avoiding environmental 
pollution, market failure, and other negative externalities. Currently, global 
environmental protection cooperation is an important trend. Developed countries have 
a long history of environmental governance and industrial adjustment, but not all 
these practices are completely portable to developing countries (Jabbour et al. 2014). 
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The latter should learn from developed countries’ advanced experience in energy and 
soil conservation as well as biodiversity maintenance. 
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Table 1 Description of selected products and factors 
Regional 
Market 
Categories 
Commodity 
Market 
Grains, oils, fresh vegetables, meat and poultry, beverages, and tobacco & alcohol, 
traditional Chinese and western medicines, books and magazines, clothing and shoes 
& hats, textiles, household appliances, daily necessities, cosmetics, jewelry, fuel, and 
construction hardware; 16 commodities. 
Factor 
Market 
Labor factor: agriculture; forestry; animal husbandry and fisheries industry; mining; 
manufacturing; electricity, gas and water production industry; construction, 
transportation, information transmission; wholesale and retailing; finance; real estate, 
leasing, and business services; scientific research and comprehensive technical 
services; water conservation and environment; education; health and social security 
sector; and public administration and social organization; 15 factors. 
Capital factor: construction and installation work and purchases of equipment, 
instruments, and other expenses; 3 factors. 
Raw material factor: fuels and energy, ferrous metal materials, nonferrous metal 
materials, chemical raw materials, timber and pulp, building materials and 
non-metallic minerals, other industrial raw materials and semi-finished products, 
agricultural and sideline products, textile raw materials; 9 factors. 
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Table 2. Spatial econometric analysis of the influence of market segmentation on regional 
overcapacity 
 OLS 
Durbin- 
Spatial fixed  
effects 
Durbin- 
Time  fixed 
effects 
Durbin- 
Spatial 
&Time fixed 
effects 
Durbin- 
Random 
effects 
ln i,tFMS  -0.027 (-1.45) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.025 
(-1.08) 
-0.055*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.75) 
ln i,tGMS  -0.008 (-0.85) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.53) 
0.006 
(1.10) 
0.005 
(0.75) 
ln i,tOS  0.188
*** 
(5.33) 
0.220*** 
(3.84) 
0.157*** 
(3.86) 
0.279*** 
(4.89) 
0.263*** 
(5.09) 
ln i,tRIS  -0.171
* 
(-1.82) 
-0.288*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.225** 
(-2.14) 
-0.542*** 
(-4.53) 
-0.441*** 
(-4.03) 
ln i,tGOV  -0.378
*** 
(-8.01) 
-0.032 
(-0.30) 
-0.333*** 
(-5.56) 
-0.130 
(-1.21) 
-0.282*** 
(-3.31) 
ln i,tOP  0.088
*** 
(4.68) 
0.007 
(0.21) 
0.057** 
(2.38) 
0.022 
(0.66) 
0.080*** 
(2.82) 
ln i,tIT  0.079
*** 
(4.00) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
0.180*** 
(4.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.12) 
0.030 
(0.78) 
ln i,tEG  -0.114
*** 
(-6.58) 
0.007 
(0.45) 
-0.132*** 
(-6.97) 
0.003 
(0.19) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
W ln i,tFMS×   0.018 (0.93) 
-0.010 
(-0.51) 
-0.005 
(-0.19) 
-0.011 
(-0.42) 
W ln i,tGMS×   -0.021
** 
(-2.10) 
-0.101** 
(-2.26) 
-0.013 
(-1.11) 
-0.015 
(-1.35) 
W ln i,tOS×   0.259
** 
(2.44) 
0.119 
(1.52) 
0.471*** 
(4.12) 
0.451*** 
(4.31) 
W ln i,tRIS×   -0.206 (-1.17) 
0.291 
(1.39) 
-1.148*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.909*** 
(-3.73) 
W ln i,tGOV×   -0.060 (-0.41) 
-0.138 
(-1.31) 
-0.381* 
(-1.89) 
-0.476*** 
(-3.14) 
W ln i,tOP×   0.038 (0.76) 
-0.010 
(-0.18) 
0.097 
(1.40) 
0.169*** 
(3.15) 
W ln i,tIT×   0.103
** 
(2.08) 
-0.012 
(-0.11) 
0.099 
(1.10) 
0.116 
(1.39) 
W ln i,tEG×   -0.027 (-1.06) 
-0.058 
(-1.18) 
-0.081** 
(-2.30) 
-0.071** 
(-2.05) 
W dep.var×   -0.102 (-1.37) 
-0.178* 
(1.70) 
-0.168** 
(-2.25) 
-0.195*** 
(-2.60) 
teta      
0.146*** 
(5.43) 
intercept -1.612
*** 
(-8.84)     
R-squared 0.440 0.832 0.497 0.848 0.830 
lik 49.97 272.40 64.77 290.57 -650.54 
LM-lag 4.231**     
R-LM-lag 0.484     
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 OLS 
Durbin- 
Spatial fixed  
effects 
Durbin- 
Time  fixed 
effects 
Durbin- 
Spatial 
&Time fixed 
effects 
Durbin- 
Random 
effects 
LM-error 3.902**     
R-LM-error 0.156     
Wald-spatial-lag  15.069* 13.648* 37.161*** 38.101*** 
LR-spatial-lag  16.269** 13.819* 47.871***  
Wald-spatial-error  13.580* 12.385 34.154*** 33.706*** 
LR-spatial-error  14.627* 12.627 37.213***  
Hausman test  18.104 
Note: (1) ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; t value in 
parentheses. (2) lik represents Log likelihood, and all LM tests correspond with the panel data test 
procedures. 
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Table 3. Decomposition of the total, direct, and indirect effects that influence capacity utilization 
 Direct effect Indirect effect General effect 
ln i,tFMS  -0.054
*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.055** 
(-2.28) 
ln i,tGMS  0.006 (1.06) 
-0.015 
(-1.46) 
-0.009 
(-0.80) 
ln i,tOS  0.245
*** 
(4.60) 
0.356*** 
(3.83) 
0.601*** 
(6.65) 
ln i,tRIS  -0.405
*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.724*** 
(-3.44) 
-1.129*** 
(-4.79) 
ln i,tGOV  -0.267
*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.364** 
(-2.61) 
-0.630*** 
(-5.02) 
ln i,tOP  0.074
** 
(2.55) 
0.136** 
(2.76) 
0.210*** 
(4.29) 
ln i,tIT  0.025 (0.61) 
0.097 
(1.30) 
0.122* 
(1.80) 
ln i,tEG  0.000 (-0.03) 
-0.063** 
(-2.00) 
-0.063* 
(-1.94) 
Note: ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; t values in 
parentheses. 
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Fig.1. Industrial Capacity Utilization by Province in China, 2002-2014 
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Fig.2. Industrial Potential Productivity by Province in China, 2002-2014 
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Fig.3. Commodity Market Segmentation Level by Province in China (2002-2014) 
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Fig.4. Factor Market Segmentation by Province in China (2002-2014) 
 
 
